Philadelphia romaine

A post shared by La Chinesca lachinescaphl. La Chinesca , Spring Garden The salt and pepper squid Caesar is an unexpected twist that really works. Crispy fried squid gets tossed with romaine lettuce and sprinkled with a generous topping of toasted sesame seeds for a take on this classic which, by the way, was in fact invented in Mexico.

But, like, perfect. A post shared by Alpen Rose alpenrosephl. At Alpen Rose, they put their spin on the classic by using pecorino Romano cheese in place of parmesan, which adds a welcome salty funkiness to the classic salad. Sidecar Bar , Graduate Hospital Lots of Caesars are sides to the main event, but at Sidecar Bar, they know sometimes you want a dinner salad. With tender poached chicken, capers, and chopped eggs, their house Caesar is perfect for just that occasion. A post shared by Charley Dove charleydovephilly.

Charley Dove , Rittenhouse Andrey Claire has rebranded as Charley Dove, a kind of Mediterranean spot with lots of grilled items and vegetable starters. Among them is a Caesar salad made with tender gem lettuce, pita croutons, and delightfully anchovy-forward dressing.

The shaved Brussels sprouts hold up nicely to the dressing, for an appealingly crunchy, surprisingly filling salad. Brown told her that the next time she was in trouble, she should see Brown early so that the case could be assigned to Harris or a judge that Harris could influence.

The appellants contend that there is insufficient evidence to show that they agreed to commit, or even knew about, two or more of the predicate acts listed in Count II and that we must therefore reverse the district court's denial of their motions for judgment of acquittal. This argument is based on the assumption that the government could only rely on evidence regarding the predicate acts alleged in Count II to establish appellants' agreement to the commission of two or more racketeering acts.

Appellants frame their sufficiency argument as if the only evidence the jury could consider on the Count I RICO conspiracy is evidence which tends to show an agreement to do the specific predicate acts charged in the substantive RICO charge of Count II.

This argument fails if Count I is not simply a conspiracy to do the specific racketeering acts set out in Count II. There are significant differences between Counts I and II which indicate to us that appellants' premise is wrong. In their post-trial motions, Phillips and Brown argued their case on the same assumption that Count I failed to allege, and the government failed to prove, that they agreed to commit two of the racketeering acts specified in Count II.

Count I simply charges multiple acts of bribery and extortion within a specified time frame. Because Count I alleges a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of multiple acts of bribery and extortion, the jury was free to consider any act of bribery and extortion that occurred within the time frame of the conspiracy.

Instead, we will review the evidence regarding the multiple acts of bribery and extortion alleged in Count I to see if it is sufficient to sustain appellants' RICO conspiracy convictions.

We view such evidence in a light most favorable to the government. Riccobene, F. In denying appellants' post-trial arguments that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, the district court correctly stated that a pattern of racketeering activity requires that the jury find:. The court relied on evidence introduced by the government regarding Commonwealth v. Massey, Commonwealth v. Mapp, Commonwealth v. Thomas and Commonwealth v.

Brown, all alleged as overt acts in Count I, as proof that Phillips had agreed to the commission of two or more acts of racketeering.

Similarly, the district court relied on Commonwealth v. Joseph Heffron, Commonwealth v. This evidence is sufficient to show that appellants agreed to participate in an enterprise which they knew conducted its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity generally described as more than one act of bribery and extortion.

Indeed, the evidence shows not only knowledge but actual commission of four specific acts on the part of Phillips and two on the part of Brown. We will therefore affirm the district court's denial of judgment of acquittal on this ground. Appellants next argue that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it could find them guilty of a RICO conspiracy if the evidence showed that each agreed to the commission of two or more racketeering acts of bribery or extortion, whether or not those racketeering acts were specified in the indictment.

We will grant a new trial if the district court erred as a matter of law in instructing the jury. Adams, F. You may conclude from all the evidence that the various acts that are alleged--and I have defined your burden on those--you may conclude that other conduct took place other than those seven acts [listed in Count II].

Consider all the evidence and determine whether or not the defendant you are considering on the conspiracy charge knowingly and willfully agreed by words or conduct to participate in a conspiracy that would have as its object the allegations of Count 2, that it would be an enterprise, as described in the indictment, engaged in interstate commerce as described in the indictment, whose affairs would be conducted as described in the indictment, through a pattern of racketeering, as I have outlined here, and that someone would commit two acts of extortion or bribery.

It is not necessary that they know that the two acts be the very ones on page 2 [of the verdict slip], because the conspiracy began in April. Some of the events may not have occurred until later, so you don't have to agree in advance that someone will agree that someone will commit any of those particular acts.

In concluding, the court said:. So, in regard to the conspiracy in this case, members of the jury, in order for the defendant you are considering to become guilty of the offense of conspiracy under Count I, you must determine whether or not the evidence satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering knew that the affairs of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia were to be conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity as described in the indictment.

It is not necessary that the government prove the defendant you are considering be found to have agreed, again, personally to commit any of the acts set forth in the indictment.

What is necessary is that the proof show that the defendant knowingly and willfully agreed to join the conspiracy with knowledge of its goals and the knowledge that at least two acts would be committed. Appellants allege that this charge allowed the jury to look beyond the seven racketeering acts in Count II and convict the defendants under Count I if they had knowledge of two or more crimes of bribery or extortion. As we have analyzed the indictment, that was permissible.

See supra Section IV. The jury was free to consider any act of bribery and extortion occurring within the time frame of the conspiracy, in accord with this circuit's case law on RICO conspiracy. See United States v. Boffa, F. In defending the district court's jury charge, the government argues that " [t]here is no requirement in the law in this circuit that the predicate act be any particular predicate act, as long as it is of a type described in the indictment.

Appellants rely heavily on United States v. Neapolitan, F. In Neapolitan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether the district court's instruction that " ' [t]he government need only prove that each defendant conspired to commit the offense of conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity' " allowed the jury to "exceed the scope of the indicted conspiracy in search of other crimes to serve as predicate acts.

The Seventh Circuit said:. It would have been preferable if the court had specifically required the jury to find that each defendant agreed to the commission of at least two of the predicate acts listed in the indictment.

This element of the offense, however, was implicitly included in the charge through the court's definition of pattern of racketeering activity, which was described as part of the object of the conspiracy.

The Seventh Circuit did say the district court erred in defining "racketeering activity" as "any act However, because the defendants failed to timely object, the Seventh Circuit's review of this instruction was limited to plain error, and it found none. In our case, there was a proper objection and any error is preserved. However, Neapolitan is distinguishable because there the government set out specific predicate acts to make up the pattern of racketeering activity and would have been properly confined to them in its proof if the issue had been preserved.

See Kenny, F. Finally, appellants argue that the district court should have granted a mistrial when Cheeks decided to plead guilty after the jury was selected. We review the district court's denial of their motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. Appellants contend that their right to freely exercise their peremptory challenges was compromised because Cheeks was negotiating a plea agreement with the government while juror selection was ongoing.

They argue that Cheeks participated in the shaping of the jury and was also privy to the defense's jury selection strategy.

They also question why the government waited until after selection of the final three alternate jurors on January 7, to announce Cheeks's decision to plead guilty, which had been reached the previous evening. While it is true that the four defendants were allowed twelve peremptory challenges to be divided as defense counsel agreed, and that counsel for Cheeks exercised two of these on January 6, , it is also true that Cheeks had not yet reached a plea agreement with the government and therefore was still a defendant in the case.

Until Cheeks reached an agreement with the government, he had every right to participate in juror selection. Appellants concede that they knew that there was always a possibility that Cheeks would become a government witness and plead guilty. They argue, however, that the government had a duty to inform the district court and the parties of ongoing negotiations so that a different juror selection process could have been used. Appellants cite no authority for this proposition. Instead, they rely on case law holding that the denial or impairment of the use of a peremptory challenge is reversible error without a showing of prejudice.

See, e. Alabama, U. However, appellants have not demonstrated that their use of their collective peremptory challenges was either denied or impaired because one of their co-defendants was engaged in ongoing negotiations with the government while participating in the juror selection process.

Furthermore, the peremptory challenge is a right to exclude potentially prejudiced jurors, not to select favorable ones, and in multiple defendant trials a co-defendant must use his peremptory challenges in conjunction with the other defendants', even if it means losing a favorable juror or having to use a challenge in a way other than he would like.

It is not clear why the government waited until after selection of the final three alternate jurors on January 7, to announce Cheeks's decision to plead guilty. Here, however, we do not believe the delay in the announcement of Cheeks's decision had any effect on the jury selection process for the following reasons. First, appellants concede that Cheeks's counsel's only participation in the selection of the final three alternate jurors was his agreement to the use of a challenge by Harris's counsel.

Second, none of the alternate jurors selected that day participated in deliberations. Finally, a plea agreement is not final until it is accepted by the court and, until that time, the accused remains a defendant in the case. For these reasons, we will affirm the district court's denial of appellants' post-trial motions pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29 c , 33 and Dickinson R. The only other evidence against Brown was the testimony of Roger Taylor, Brown's father-in-law.

Roger Taylor testified at trial that Brown had introduced him to Harris and Cheeks and that he contacted Cheeks and Brown about a fine he was obligated to pay. The district court concluded this was only marginally relevant. Sligh, racketeering act no. Heffron, racketeering act no. In the district court, Phillips and Brown attacked the sufficiency of the conspiracy indictment itself pursuant to Rule 34 on the same assumption that Count I is merely the conspiracy analogue to the substantive offense charged in Count II.

They do not make that argument here, seeking only to limit the government in its proof of Count I RICO conspiracy to knowledge of the predicate acts charged in Count II. The defects in the indictment are not jurisdictional, see infra note 4. Accordingly, they are waived. We were initially troubled by the sufficiency of Count I of the indictment because of its failure to specify, with particularity, which acts of bribery and extortion appellants allegedly agreed to commit.

The indictment also sufficiently apprises the appellants of the charges against them and protects them against future double jeopardy problems under our decision in United States v.

Kenny, F. Travel Act indictment which charges underlying elements of crime by reference to statutory violations of extortion and bribery and specifies time period of conspiracy not insufficiently vague under Fifth and Sixth Amendments , cert.

To the extent the indictment is otherwise deficient, appellants have waived the issue by failing to raise in this appeal the district court's denial of their request for a bill of particulars. These acts are specifically set out in the indictment as overt acts. Although better practice would have listed them as predicate acts, not overt acts, they are acts of bribery and extortion within the definition of the racketeering acts generally set out in the charging language of Count I.

To exclude their consideration by the jury in the absence of a bill of particulars which places them outside its confinement would be unnecessary and unreasonable. While we are concerned about the generality of Count I's charging language, see supra note 4, we are constrained by our internal operating rules and prior case law upholding an analogous indictment.

We note the apparent confusion in this portion of the district court's charge, probably caused by the awkward construction of Counts I and II of the indictment. Strictly speaking, the object of the Count I conspiracy was the conduct of the enterprise through a pattern of bribery and extortion, not just the specific acts alleged in Count II. To the extent the court's charge incorrectly limited the jury to considering only the racketeering acts specifically set out in Count II, its adverse impact was on the government, not appellants.

We also note that construing this instruction as one limiting the jury in its consideration of Count I to the government's proof of the specific racketeering acts set forth in Count II would seem inconsistent with the later portion of the court's charge, set out infra.